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EU	  State	  Aid	  Laws	  and	  British	  assumptions:	  a	  reality	  check.	  
	  




EU	  state	  aid	   laws	  do	  not	  prevent	  a	   future	  Labour	  government	   from	   introducing	  necessary	  
radical	  reform	  of	  the	  British	  economy.	  This	  article	  explains	  EU	  state	  aid	  rules	  –	  briefly,	  their	  
primary	   purpose	   is	   to	   protect	   a	   European	   scale	   single	   market	   and	   their	   genesis	   lies	   in	  
avoiding	   the	   ruinous	   beggar-­‐thy-­‐neighbour	   micro-­‐economic	   policies	   of	   the	   1930s.	   Their	  
design	   is	   not	   intended	   to	   promote	   neo-­‐liberalism1,	   but,	   rather,	   requires	   that	   state	   aid	   is	  
channelled	   to	   support	   the	   kind	   of	   social	   market	   economy	   associated	   in	   particular	   with	  
Germany,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Scandinavian	  countries2.	  	  Developments	  in	  EU	  state	  aid	  law	  
in	  the	  last	  few	  years	  have	  made	  it	  much	  clearer	  what	  national	  governments	  can	  do	  in	  terms	  
of	  domestic	  economic	  restructuring3.	  These	  legal	  refinements	  make	  it	  feasible	  to	  assess	  the	  
likely	  potential	  impact	  of	  EU	  state	  aid	  rules	  on	  the	  pledges	  made	  in	  2017	  Labour	  manifesto.	  
We	  have	  conducted	  that	  assessment	  with	  respect	  to	  each	  of	  Labour’s	  26	  specific	  economic	  
proposals	   and	   find	   that	   the	   effect	  would	   likely	   be	   negligible.	   Particular	   concern	   has	   been	  
expressed	  in	  some	  ‘Lexit’	  quarters	  about	  state	  aid	  rules	  preventing	  those	  parts	  of	  the	  Labour	  
programme	  which	  favour	  nationalisation.4	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case;	  nor	  would	  Lexit	  in	  any	  event	  
be	  a	  mechanism	  for	  avoiding	  State	  Aid	  laws.	  Finally,	  in	  illustration	  of	  our	  case,	  we	  note	  how	  
state	  aid	  rules	  affected	  the	  recent	  development	  of	  a	  large	  scale	  but	  little	  known	  UK	  not-­‐for-­‐
profit	  public	  service,	  the	  National	  Employment	  Savings	  Trust	  (“NEST”).	  This	  was	  a	  new	  public	  
service	   set	   up	   to	   provide	   workplace	   pensions	   by	   the	   2005-­‐2010	   Labour	   administration.	  	  
There	  were	  constraints	  imposed	  on	  NEST	  by	  the	  UK	  government,	  allegedly	  deriving	  from	  EU	  
state	  aid	  rules-­‐	  but	  these	  were	  entirely	  driven	  by	  British	  beliefs	  about	  EU	  state	  aid	  law	  and	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1	  “	  a	  radical	  socialist	  programme	  that	  initiated	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  state	  and	  state	  ownership,	  public	  procurement	  and	  
managed	  trade	  would	  be	  deemed	  illegal	  under	  European	  law”	  	  Larry	  Eliott	  “Why	  the	  moaning?	  If	  anything	  can	  beat	  
capitalism’s	  fat	  cats,	  it’s	  Brexit.”	  Guardian	  21	  July	  2017.	  
2	  Amendments	  to	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  agreed	  at	  Lisbon	  mean	  that	  a	  social	  market	  economy	  has	  
been	  enshrined	  as	  an	  objective	  of	  the	  EU	  since	  2009.	  	  
3	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  system	  requires	  no	  reforms	  at	  all.	  It	  is	  the	  case	  that	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  
the	  Efta	  Surveillance	  Authority	  have	  discretion	  over	  the	  timeframes	  in	  which	  they	  clear	  national	  aid	  proposals.	  
This	  could	  be	  a	  potential	  concern	  to	  an	  incoming	  radical	  UK	  government.	  However,	  to	  minimise	  that	  concern	  
the	  Labour	  Party	  would	  be	  advised	  to	  engage	  early	  with	  supranational	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  ensure	  rapid	  
clearances.	  Such	  engagement	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  facilitated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  European	  policy	  makers	  would	  
regard	  the	  content	  of	  Labour’s	  programme	  as	  what	  any	  self-­‐respecting	  European	  administration	  should	  
already	  be	  doing.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  UK	  currently	  	  spends	  less	  on	  non-­‐crisis	  related	  state	  aid	  than	  
almost	  every	  other	  Member	  State	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  GDP	  and	  would	  have	  to	  more	  than	  triple	  its	  expenditure	  
to	  reach	  the	  levels	  spent	  by	  Germany,	  see	  the	  European	  Commission,	  State	  Aid	  Scoreboard	  	  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html.	  
4	  Morning	  Star,	  To	  support	  public	  ownership	  –	  vote	  for	  an	  EU	  Left	  Exit,	  21	  May	  2016	  
UK	  domestic	  interests.	  When	  finally	  asked,	  the	  EU	  Commission	  said	  these	  constraints	  were	  
not	  required	  by	  EU	  state	  aid	  law.	  
	  
	  
2. A	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  EU	  state	  aid	  rules.	  
	  
The	  EU	   state	  aid	   rules	  have	  been	  an	   integral	  element	  of	   the	  EU	   since	   its	   inception	  as	   the	  
European	  Economic	  Community	   in	  1957.	   Three	  of	   the	   countries	  which	   signed	   the	  original	  
Treaty	  had	  Socialist	  prime	  ministers,	  three	  had	  Christian	  Democratic	  leaders.	  The	  purpose	  of	  
the	  Treaty	  was	  to	  create	  a	  common	  economic	  space	  within	  which	  the	  mixed	  economies	  of	  
Europe	  could	  prosper	  and	  where	  the	  economic	  drivers	  considered	  to	  have	  fuelled	  the	  rise	  of	  
populist	   dictators	   prior	   to	   the	   war	   could	   be	   controlled.	   State	   aid	   rules	   were	   designed	   to	  
meet	  both	  these	  ends.	  The	  greater	  economic	  space	  was	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  larger	  market	  
that	   would	   generate	   increased	   opportunities	   for	   specialisation	   at	   firm	   level	   and	   the	  
exploitation	   of	   national	   comparative	   advantage.	   State	   aid	   rules	   were	   intended	   to	   ensure	  
that	  individual	  states	  would	  not	  try	  and	  free-­‐ride	  on	  this	  larger	  common	  market	  by	  providing	  
aid	   to	   their	   national	   companies	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   unsubsidised	   rivals	   in	   other	   member	  
countries5.	   In	   the	   1920s	   and	   1930s,	   just	   such	   temptations	   had	   led	   countries	   to	   provide	  
export	   subsidies	   and	   provoked	   both	   tit-­‐for-­‐tat	   export	   subsidies	   and	   counteracting	   tariffs;	  
helping	  create	  the	  ruinous	  economic	  conditions	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  fascist	  dictatorships.	  
In	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   European	   Economic	   Community,	   the	   Community’s	   institutions	  
focused	   on	   controlling	   aid	   to	   private	   enterprise.	   A	   single	  market	   could	   not	   be	   created	   if	  
inefficient	  national	   enterprises	  were	  propped	  up,	  preventing	  more	  efficient	   enterprises	   in	  
other	  member	  states	   from	  expanding6.	   In	   the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  as	  countries	   reacted	  to	  oil	  
crises	  and	  lack	  of	  competitiveness	  against	  Japanese	  and	  US	  manufacturing	  by	  nationalising	  
and	   subsidising	   loss-­‐making	   national	   enterprises,	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   Community	  
institutions	  was	  refocused	  away	  from	  aid	  granted	  to	  private	  enterprises	  to	  controlling	  aid	  to	  
state	   owned	   enterprises.	   If	   economic	   activities	   were	   nationalised	   and	   then	   subsidised	   to	  
compete,	   they	   would	   have	   the	   same	   potential	   effect	   of	   eliminating	   the	   single	  market	   as	  
subsidised	  private	  national	  enterprises.	  	  
	  
3. Control	  of	  State	  Aid	  Today.	  	  
	  
3.1. 	  Structure	  of	  the	  rules	  
	  
The	  drafters	  of	  the	  Treaty	  were	  aware	  that	  the	  market	  does	  not	  always	  deliver	  and	  
wanted	  states	  to	  have	  scope	  to	  provide	  aid	  to	  enterprises	  where	  this	  was	   justified.	  
The	   state	   aid	   rules	   are	   intended	   to	   control	   the	   provision	   of	   state	   aid	   to	   individual	  
companies	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  can	  be	  provided	  where	  it	  meets	  a	  public	  policy	  goal	  but	  
cannot	  be	  provided	  where	  it	  undermines	  the	  single	  market.	   	  So	  the	  rules	   in	  the	  EU	  
Treaty	  are	  structured	  as	  (i)	  a	  general	  rule	  prohibiting	  aid	  from	  the	  state	  to	  individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Spaak	  report	  	  1956,	  at	  https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-­‐content/-­‐/unit/1c8aa583-­‐8ec5-­‐41c4-­‐9ad8-­‐
73674ea7f4a7/dee61d43-­‐7dc3-­‐4383-­‐a3dc-­‐eb1e9f2e78db.	  
6 See M Merola, ‘The Forces Shaping State Aid Control in the EU’, in L. Rubini & J. Hawkins (eds) ‘What 
Shapes the Law? Reflections on the History, Law, Politics and Economics of International and European 
Subsidy Disciplines’- e-book, EUI-University of Birmingham, 2016, 101. 
enterprises	  in	  principle,	  and	  then	  (ii)	  a	  series	  of	  exceptions7,	  some	  which	  are	  always	  
applicable	  (for	  example,	  aid	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  natural	  disaster)	  and	  others	  which	  are	  
discretionary.	  Some	  of	  the	  discretionary	  exceptions	  are	  very	  wide,	  for	  example,	  aid	  is	  
potentially	  permissible	  “…to	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  certain	  economic	  activities	  
or	   of	   certain	   economic	   areas,	   where	   such	   aid	   does	   not	   adversely	   affect	   trading	  
conditions	   to	   an	   extent	   contrary	   to	   the	   common	   interest	   “8.	   In	   order	   for	   such	  
exceptions	   not	   be	   a	   mechanism	   for	   undermining	   the	   general	   principle,	   the	   rules	  
around	  their	  operation	  are	  policed	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  
Courts.	  Exemptions	  are	  delivered	  either	  (i)	  by	  individual	  notification	  of	  proposals	  to	  
the	  Commission	  from	  Member	  States,	  which	  the	  Commission	  then	  assesses	  case	  by	  
case	  and	  assess	  whether	  to	  approve	  it	  or	  not	  (ii)	  by	  “block”	  ie.	  pre-­‐defined	  categories	  
of	  legitimate	  aid	  that	  can	  be	  granted	  without	  any	  prior	  notification9.	  	  
	  
3.2. 	  State	  aid	  is	  defined	  to	  avoid	  interfering	  with	  general	  regulation	  
	  
The	  Member	  States	  adopted	  particular	  wording	  to	  ensure	  that	  EU	  state	  aid	  rules	  would	  
not	  interfere	  with	  general	  regulation.	  	  To	  give	  a	  hypothetical	  practical	  example,	  while	  a	  
tax	  break	  given	  to	  a	  single	  or	  several	  favoured	  individual	  multinationals	  could	  be	  caught	  
by	  state	  aid	  rules,	  a	  general	  national	  economy-­‐wide	  cut	  in	  corporation	  tax	  could	  not	  be	  
caught.	   (Any	   measures	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   latter	   would	   require	   harmonization	   rules	  
agreed	  by	  the	  Member	  States).	  It	  can	  of	  course	  be	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  what	  consists	  
of	   a	   selective	  measure	   and	  what	   is	   a	   general	  measure	  when	   categories	   of	   enterprise	  
benefit.	  Nonetheless,the	  Court	   of	   Justice	  has	  held	   that	  Member	   States	   are	   entitled	   to	  
apply	  a	  different	  tax	  system	  for	  cooperative	  societies	  in	  general	  because	  of	  their	  specific	  
characteristics	  that	  distinguish	  them	  from	  corporations.10	  State	  aid	  rules	  do	  not	  impede	  
general	   regulation	   including	   consumer	   protection	   or	   labour	   laws.	   For	   example,	   the	  
European	  Court	  of	   Justice	   refused	   to	  endorse	   the	  view	   in	  a	   case	  dealing	  with	  German	  
rules	  prohibiting	  speculation	  in	  land	  designated	  for	  agricultural	  uses	  that	  as	  a	  such	  a	  rule	  
potentially	   constituted	   state	   aid	   for	   farmers,	   the	   state	   as	   a	   rational	   market	   operator	  
should	  always	  take	  the	  highest	  price	  11.	  
	  
3.3. How	  is	  aid	  assessed	  as	  acceptable?	  
	  
Assessment	  of	  the	  acceptability	  of	  aid	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  logical	  reasoned	  process.	  In	  order	  
for	  an	  aid	  which	  requires	  notification	  to	  be	  cleared,	  the	  applicant	  has	  to	  show	  that:	  (i)	   it	   is	  
aimed	  at	  making	  a	  material	  improvement	  that	  the	  market	  alone	  will	  not	  deliver;	  (ii)	  there	  is	  
a	   logical	   connection	   between	   the	   provision	   of	   aid	   and	   a	   change	   in	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	  
undertaking	  that	  receives	  the	  aid	  that	  will	  bring	  about	  the	  outcome	  the	  aid	   is	   intended	  to	  
achieve;	  (iii)	   the	  aid	   is	   limited	  to	  the	  minimum	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  outcome,	  and	  (iv)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The key provisions are contained in two articles of the Treaty, now Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and have 
barely changed since 1957. 
8 Article 107(3)(c) TFEU 
9 For example, Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1–78. 
For instance, research and development and innovation, to risk capital, broadband, regional aid, aviation, energy 
and the environment, all these are sectors, are all ‘block exempted’ areas. 
10 Joined cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos ECLI EU 2011 I-07611. 
11 Case C-39/14, T. Herbs ECLI:EU:C:2015:470. 
the	  benefits	  of	  the	  aid	  outweigh	  any	  costs	  in	  terms	  of	  damage	  to	  trade;	  and	  (v)	  the	  grant	  is	  
transparent.	   An	   important	   benefit	   of	   this	   reasoned	   process	   is	   that	   it	   forces	   states	   to	  
transparently	   assess	   why	   they	   are	   granting	   an	   aid	   and	   to	   demonstrate	   why	   there	   is	   a	  
reasonable	  basis	   for	  concluding	  that	   it	   is	   in	  the	  public	   interest12.	   	   In	  those	  areas	  where	  no	  
prior	  notification	   is	  necessary,	  Member	  states	  are	  still	   required	  to	  comply	  with	  strict	   rules	  
on	  transparency	  and	  publications	  of	  the	  aid	  granted.	  This	  ‘evidentiary’	  characteristic	  of	  state	  
aid	  control	  is	  thus	  an	  important	  corrective	  to	  the	  susceptibility	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  either	  to	  
be	   held	   to	   ransom	   by	   multi-­‐national	   corporations	   or	   to	   indulge	   the	   “corporate	   welfare	  
state”13	  Without	  the	  EU	  framework	  obliging	  Member	  State	  to	  direct	  scare	  aid	  resources	  to	  
impoverished	   regions	   or	   innovation,	   spending	   would	   likely	   be	   even	   more	   skewed	   to	   big	  
corporations	   and	   already	   favoured	   regions.	   Multinationals	   would	   tour	   national	   capitals	  
demanding	  greater	  subsidies.	  
	  
3.4. State	  aid	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  state	  from	  investing	  in	  public	  enterprises.	  
	  
	  The	  EU	  Treaty	  enshrines	  the	  right	  of	  Member	  States	  to	  run	  public	  enterprises	  should	  they	  
choose.	   The	   state	   aid	   rules	   do	   not	   interfere	   with	   this	   right.	   State	   aid	   rules	   shape	   what	  
Member	  States	  do	  depending	  on	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  functioning	  market	  or	  not,	  Where	  there	  
is	  a	   functioning	  market	   the	  state’s	   investment	  must	  be	  a	   rational	  economic	   investment	  of	  
the	   type	   a	   private	   investor	  would	   also	  make.	   This	   principle	   is	   now	   known	   as	   the	   ‘market	  
operator	   principle14.	   In	   the	   second	   situation	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   EU	   state	   aid	  
rules	  do	  not	  require	  that	  the	  state	  only	  operate	  profitable	  public	  services.	  Where	  a	  Member	  
State	   decides	   that	   a	   service	   ought	   to	   be	   provided	   to	  meet	   a	   need,	   and	   it	   is	   at	   liberty	   to	  
define	  the	  need,	  but	  where	  there	  are	  no	  economic	  actors	  capable	  of	  offering	  that	  service,	  
the	  member	  state	  is	  free	  to	  set	  up	  a	  subsidised	  service15.	  Indeed,	  the	  Court	  has	  recently	  set	  
out	  a	  set	  of	  circumstances	  which	  avoids	  the	  funding	  of	  many	  public	  services	  being	  brought	  
within	  the	  state	  aid	  rules	  at	  all	  and	  therefore	  avoids	  the	  need	  for	  notification	  (see	  section	  
4.3	  below).	  	  
	  
3.5. The	  political	  economy	  of	  state	  aid	  
	  
To	  summarise,	  and	  in	  general,	  a	  Member	  State	  cannot	  subsidise	  a	  private	  enterprise	  
operating	  on	  an	  existing	  market	  but	  can	  invest	  in	  one,	  it	  cannot	  subsidise	  (but	  can	  invest)	  in	  
a	  public	  service	  operating	  on	  an	  existing	  market,	  and,	  it	  can	  subsidise	  a	  public	  service	  
operating	  where	  there	  is	  no	  viable	  market.	  These	  general	  rules	  do	  not	  sound	  much	  like	  neo-­‐
liberalism16.	  They	  do	  fall	  within	  what	  is	  usually	  considered	  the	  classic	  exposition	  of	  European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Note the standard of proof a balance of probabilities one whereas, at least in the NEST case,  UK officials 
seemed to apply the criminal evidential test of beyond reasonable doubt, making the case more difficult. 
13 K Farnsworth (2013) “Public Policies for Private Corporations: the British Corporate Welfare State” 21(4) 
Renewal 51. 
14 Notice C-2016 Commission Notice on the notion of Aid ex Art 107 (1) TFEU OJC 262, 19.07.2016, p.18.  
15Joined Cases C-341/06 P and C-342/06 UFEX ECLI:EU:C:2008:375. 
16	  Neo-­‐liberalism	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  many	  ways.	  Nicol	  in	  part	  uses	  the	  following	  definition	  “	  a	  model	  of	  societal	  
relations	  in	  which	  government	  regulation	  and	  social	  welfare	  guarantees	  are	  reduced	  in	  order	  to	  foster	  the	  play	  
of	  market	  forces	  driven	  by	  private	  enterprises	  pursuing	  profit	  maximisation”	  and	  “an	  almost	  doctrinal	  fixation	  
on	  free	  trade,	  privatization	  and	  small	  government,	  and	  unfettered	  markets	  to	  foster	  economic	  growth	  and	  
wealth	  generation,	  as	  opposed	  to	  government	  action	  and	  collective	  bargaining	  to	  promote	  social	  and	  
economic	  equality.”	  Nicol	  (2009)	  The	  Constitutional	  Protection	  of	  Capitalism,	  p.3.In	  practice	  in	  his	  book	  he	  
social	  democracy,	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  German	  Social	  Democratic	  Party’s	  1959	  Bad	  
Godesberg	  formulation:	  “The	  market	  where	  possible;	  the	  state	  where	  necessary”17.	  	  
	  
4. More	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  EU	  state	  aid	  rules.	  
	  
There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	   important	  refinements	  of	  the	  state	  aid	  rules	  during	  the	   last	  
few	  years	  and	  they	  underline	  that	  state	  aid	  rules	  do	  not	  prevent	  government	  spending	  but	  
channel	  it	  in	  particular	  ways.	  Indeed,	  in	  one	  important	  respect	  these	  developments	  protect	  
government	   spending	   generally	   by	   targeting	   state	   sponsored	   tax	   evasion.	   These	  
developments	   have	   been	   at	   the	   behest	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   which	   renegotiated	   the	  
Treaties	   to	  make	   it	   clear,	  not	   least	   to	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	  European	  Court	  of	   Justice,	  
that	  competition	  was	  a	  tool,	  not	  a	  goal	  of	  the	  European	  Union18.	  
	  
4.1. 	  Industrial	  policy.	  
	  
The	  approach	  of	   the	  EU	  has	   followed	   the	  direction	   taken	  by	  northern	  European	  countries	  
like	   Germany,	   which	   have	   never	   taken	   the	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	   view	   that	   industrial	   policy	   was	   a	  
mistake19.	  What	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  northern	  European	  countries	  since	  the	  1970s	  has	  been	  a	  
move	  from	  what	  is	  described	  as	  “vertical”	  to	  “horizontal”	  industrial	  policy.	  Instead	  of	  picking	  
individual	   “national	   champions”,	   it	   is	   about	   setting	   policy	   frameworks	   (which	   can	   include	  
aid,	   but	   aid	   available	   to	   any	   qualifying	   applicant,	   for	   example,	   aid	   for	   research	   and	  
development)	   and	   then	   letting	   arm’s	   length	   agents	   compete	   within	   the	   frameworks.20	  
Horizontal	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   economy-­‐wide,	   policies	   are	   tailored	   to	   specific	  
sectors.	   EU	   industrial	   policy,	   for	   example,	   particularly	   seeks	   to	   support	   advances	   in	  
advanced	  manufacturing	  technologies	  for	  clean	  production;	  key	  enabling	  technologies	  for	  all	  
industrial	   production	   	   (micro-­‐	   and	   nanoelectronics,	   advanced	   materials,	   industrial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
narrows	  it	  down	  to	  “…above	  all	  the	  choice	  between	  markets	  and	  public	  sector	  monopoly.”	  Ibid,p.1.	  While	  
public	  monopolies	  could	  be	  preferable	  to	  private	  monopolies	  (depending	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  other	  regulatory	  
tools),	  few	  would	  argue	  that	  they	  were	  an	  appropriate	  tool	  for	  the	  ubiquitous	  pursuit	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  
equality	  on	  all	  markets	  and	  this	  has	  generally	  been	  the	  dividing	  line	  in	  political	  economy	  between	  communists	  
and	  social	  democrats	  since	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Bernstein,	  E.	   “Evolutionary	  Socialism:	  A	  
Criticism	  and	  Affirmation,	  Random	  House,	  1961	  (originally	  published	  in	  German	  in	  1899).	  
	  
17	  Fletcher,	  R.	  (1987)	  “Bernstein	  to	  Brandt.	  A	  short	  history	  of	  German	  social	  democracy”,	  p.197.	  
18 In the negotiations over the Lisbon Treaty, the UK lost an argument over the content of the objectives of the 
EU. Article 3(1)(g) was removed. Article 3(1)(g) included as a primary objective: “(g) a system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted.” President Sarkozy explained: “. This perhaps gives a little 
more humanity to Europe. Because as an ideology, as dogma, what did competition give to Europe? It has given 
less and less to the people who vote at the European elections, and less and less to the people who believe in 
Europe. There was perhaps a need to reflect. I believe in competition, I believe in markets, but I believe in 
competition as a means and not an end in itself. This may also give a different legal direction to the 
Commission. That of a competition that is there to support the emergence of European champions, to carry out a 
true industrial policy. It was not question of making an economic Treaty or a liberal Treaty and explain it to the 
citizen. It was a question of turning our backs to ideology, dogma and naivety.” Cited in Riley, A. (2007) The 
EU Reform Treaty and the Competition Protocol. Undermining EC Competition Law. CEPS Policy Brief, 
No.142, September 2007  
19 A Tarrant (2012) “Interview with Mathias Machnig – a modern economy must be green and hot” Policy 
Network 
20 P.A Buiges, and K Sekkat, (2009) Industrial Policy in Europe, Japan and the USA. Amounts, Mechanisms 
and Effectiveness. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
biotechnology,	   photonics,	   nanotechnology);	   bio-­‐based	   products;	   encouraging	   the	  
construction	  industry	  to	  becoming	  more	  sustainable;	  clean	  vehicles	  and	  vessels;	  and	  smart	  
grids21.	   The	   EU	   has	   also	   set	   itself	   the	   objective	   of	   increasing	   the	   level	   of	   overall	   EU	   GDP	  
coming	   from	   manufacturing	   by	   2020.	   The	   role	   of	   state	   aid	   rules	   in	   this	   context	   is	   two-­‐
pronged	   (i)	   to	   prevent	   Member	   States	   propping	   up	   unsuccessful	   national	   firms	   so	   that	  
resources	  go	  to	  those	  which	  are	  capable	  of	  delivering	  the	  goods	  and	  services	  of	  the	  future,	  
and	   (ii)	   to	   remedy	   any	   market	   failures,	   such	   as	   insufficient	   support	   for	   research	  
development	   in	   priority	   areas,	   inadequate	   flows	   of	   capital	   to	   SMEs,	   or	   inadequate	  
infrastructure	  which	  jeopardise	  the	  ability	  of	  any	  firm	  to	  participate:	  “State	  Aid	  rules	  provide	  
a	   framework	   that	   directs	   Member	   States'	   investments	   to	   address	   identified	   market	  
failures”22.	   The	  EU	  has	  also,	   like	  Germany,	  put	   sustainability	  as	  an	  organising	  principle	   for	  
industrial	  policy23.	  For	  example,	   in	  order	  to	  accelerate	  the	  flow	  of	  state	   investment	   in	  this	  
area,	  Member	  States	  do	  not	  have	  to	  seek	  authorisation	  for	  aid	  to	  the	  private	  or	  public	  sector	  
which	  assists	  enterprises	  to	  meet	  standards	  which	  Member	  States	  wish	  to	  set	  and	  which	  go	  
further	  than	  mandatory	  EU	  environmental	  standards24.	  
	  
4.2 State	  aid	  rules	  against	  corporate	  tax	  evasion.	  	  
	  
Since	  June	  2013,	  the	  Commission	  has	  been	  investigating	  the	  tax	  ruling	  practices	  of	  Member	  
States.	  A	  dedicated	  Task	  Force	  Tax	  Planning	  Practices	  was	  set	  up	  in	  summer	  2013	  to	  follow	  
up	   on	   public	   allegations	   of	   favourable	   tax	   treatment	   of	   certain	   companies	   voiced	   in	   the	  
media	  and	  in	  national	  Parliaments.	  “Sweetheart	  deals”	  for	   individual	  companies	  fall	  within	  
the	   definition	   of	   state	   aid	   since	   a	  measure	   by	   which	   the	   public	   authorities	   grant	   certain	  
undertakings	  favourable	  tax	  treatment	  places	  them	  in	  a	  more	  favourable	  financial	  position	  
than	  other	  taxpayers.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  investigations,	  the	  Commission	  found	  against	  individual	  
tax	  rulings	  granted	  by	  Ireland,	  Luxembourg	  and	  the	  Netherlands.25	  	  
	  
4.3	  A	  Market	  with	  limits:	  Public	  Services	  Obligations	  	  
	  
The	  definition	  of	  State	  aid	  -­‐	  and	  consequently	  the	  scope	  of	  State	  aid	  rules	  -­‐	  has	  boundaries.	  	  
The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   held	   that	   compensation	   for	   the	   discharge	   of	   public	   service	  
obligations	  would	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  aid.	  In	  the	  Altmark	  case26,	   	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  set	  
out	  specific	  criteria	  to	  be	  met	  when	  subsidy	  for	  when	  funding	  for	  public	  services	  falls	  outside	  
state	  aid:	  
	  	  “(...)	   First,	   the	   recipient	   undertaking	   must	   actually	   have	   public	   service	   obligations	   to	  
discharge	  and	  those	  obligations	  must	  be	  clearly	  defined	  (...)	  :	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Commission (2012) ‘A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery — Industrial Policy 
Communication Update  (COM(2012) 0582).   
22 EU Commission Communication, (2010) “An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era Putting 
Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage”, p.10.  
23. Ibid. See the similarities with the SPD’s Green Industrial Policy,  B Mikfield, (2011) Ecological Industrial 
Policy .A Strategic Approach for Social Democracy in Germany Friedrich Ebart Stiftung. 
24 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and 
energy 2014-2020 (2014/C 200/01) 28/6/2014. 
25Ireland for Apple Sales International and of Apple Operations Europe; the Netherlands for manufacturing 
activities of Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV Luxembourg for the financing activities of Fiat Finance and 
Trade Luxembourg for the activities of Amazon, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-663_en.htm. The 
recovery decision against Apple is at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm 
26 Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg (Altmark), ECLI:EU:C2003:415. 
	  (...)	  Second,	  the	  parameters	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  the	  compensation	  is	  calculated	  must	  be	  
established	  in	  advance	  in	  an	  objective	  and	  transparent	  manner	  (...)	  	  
(...)	   Third,	   the	   compensation	   cannot	   exceed	  what	   is	   necessary	   to	   cover	   all	   or	   part	   of	   the	  
costs	   incurred	   in	   the	   discharge	   of	   the	   public	   services	   obligation,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  
relevant	  receipts	  and	  a	  reasonable	  profit27	  (...)	  	  
(...)	   Fourth,	   where	   the	   undertaking	  which	   is	   to	   discharge	   public	   service	   obligations	   ,	   in	   a	  
specific	  case,	  is	  not	  chosen	  pursuant	  to	  a	  public	  procurement	  procedure,	  which	  would	  allow	  
for	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  tenderer	  capable	  of	  providing	  those	  services	  at	  the	  least	  cost	  to	  the	  
community,	   the	   level	   of	   compensation	   needed	   must	   be	   determined	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  costs,	  which	  a	  typical	  undertaking,	  well	  run	  and	  adequately	  provided	  within	  
the	  same	  sector	  would	  incur,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  receipts	  and	  a	  reasonable	  profit	  from	  
discharging	  the	  obligations.”	  
The	   Altmark	   judgement	   has	   now	   been	   fully	   incorporated	   in	   a	   series	   of	   Commission	  
instrument	   aimed	   at	   clearly	   sheltering	   public	   services	   obligations	   (the	   so	   called	   “Almunia	  
package”).	   Thus	   	  measures	   aimed	  at	   funding	   ‘social’	   services	   (schools	   –	  hospitals	   –	   sports	  
centres	   and	   so	   on)	   can	   be	   exempted	   ex	   ante	   from	   any	   control28.	   Even	   if	   funding	   did	   not	  
meet	  all	   the	  Altmark	   criteria,	   an	  aid	   can	  nonetheless	  obtain	   clearance	   from	   the	  European	  
Commission	   if	   the	   aid	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   service	   of	   general	   economic	   interest	   (“SGEI”)	   and	  
prohibition	   of	   the	   aid	   would	   obstruct	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   particular	   public	   service	  
assigned	   to	   the	  body.	  SGEIs	  are	  not	  defined.	   It	   is	  within	   the	  scope	  of	   the	  Member	  State’s	  
discretion	   to	  decide	   that	  a	   service	   is	  of	  general	  economic	   interest	   	  and	  should	  be	  publicly	  
provided	   if	   private	   undertakings	  will	   not	   provide	   to	   the	   same	   “extent	   or	   under	   the	   same	  
conditions”	   as	   the	   Member	   State	   considers	   to	   be	   in	   the	   public	   interest29.	   Lifting	   the	  
prohibition	  on	  an	  aid	  must	  not	  affect	  the	  development	  of	  trade	  between	  Member	  States	  to	  
an	  extent	  which	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Union.	  	  
	  
4.4.	  Targeting	  of	  controls	  
	  
The	  widespread	  observance	  of	  EU	  state	  aid	  rules	  is	  in	  practice	  relatively	  recent.	  It	  really	  only	  
began	  to	  be	  taken	  notice	  of	  by	  many	  national	  public	  services	  in	  the	  later	  1990s.	  Experience	  
of	   reviewing	   	   a	   much	   greater	   number	   of	   cases	   since	   then	   has	   led	   the	   Commission	   to	  
conclude	  that	  there	  are	  many	  forms	  of	  state	  aid	  that	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  notified	  and	  can	  be	  
assumed	   to	  be	   in	   conformity	  with	   the	   rules	   as	   long	   as	   they	  meet	   criteria	   in	   the	   state	   aid	  
block	   exemption30.	   These	   include	  national	   public	   investments	   in	   roads,	   inland	  waterways,	  
rail,	  and	  water	  distribution	  networks,	   local	  public	   investments	   in	  broadband,	   research	  and	  
energy	   infrastructures,	   hospitals,	   old	   age	   homes	   and	   regional	   urban	   development	   funds,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Note	  this	  is	  an	  upper	  boundary.	  The	  state	  is	  not	  required	  to	  ensure	  any	  profit.	  The	  rule	  is	  there	  to	  prevent	  
over	  compensation.	  
28 Commission Decision of 20 December on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest [2012] OJ L7 p 3. 
29 European Commission “Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union state 
aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest”, OJC 8/4 of 
11.1.2012, para 47 
30 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1342_en.htm 
culture	   and	   heritage	   conservation,	   audio-­‐visual	   works,	   sports	   and	   recreational	  
infrastructures31.	  
	  
5. Labour	  Party	  manifesto	  and	  state	  aid	  rules	  
	  
Our	  assessment	  is	  that	  of	  the	  26	  specific	  economic	  measures	  set	  out	  in	  Labour’s	  manifesto	  
at	  the	  2017	  Election,	  most	  (17)	  do	  not	  even	  potentially	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  State	  Aid	  
rules.	   Of	   those	   that	   could,	   7	   are	   likely	   to	   fall	   within	   block	   exemptions,	   for	   example,	  
infrastructure	   spending	   is	   not	   an	   aid	   unless	   it	   directly	   competes	   with	   already	   existing	  
privately	  funded	  infrastructure.	  This	  likely	  leaves	  only	  two	  measure	  which	  might	  have	  to	  be	  
notified:	  the	  state	  investment	  bank/regional	  bank	  proposition	  and	  the	  state	  funded	  regional	  
energy	   suppliers.	  This	  assessment	   is	  of	   course	  provisional,	  as	   the	  analysis	  depends	  on	   the	  
precise	  content	  of	  Labour’s	  plans.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  provisional	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  Labour	  
has	  plenty	  of	  scope	  to	  act	  in	  these	  areas	  without	  any	  impediment	  from	  state	  aid	  rules.	  With	  
respect	  to	  the	  banks,	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	  (i)	   that	  the	  UK	  has	  already	  had	  clearance	  for	  state	  
banks	  to	  provide	   investment	  to	  SMEs	  and	  for	  renewable	  energy,	  and	  (ii)	   that	  EU’s	  general	  
policy	   is	   to	   increase	   state	   aid,	   where	   justified,	   to	   SMEs	   and	   for	   renewable	   energy.	  With	  
regards	   to	   regional	   energy	   suppliers,	   the	   proposed	   reason	   for	   intervention	   is	   to	   reduce	  
excessive	   profits,	   so	   there	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   ample	   scope	   to	   operate	   profitable	   public	  
enterprises	   which	   did	   not	   require	   aid.	   	   The	   recent	   European	   Commission	   Guidelines	   on	  
environmental	   protection	   and	   energy	   exempt	   aid	   for	   renewable	   energy	   projects	   below	  
certain	  thresholds	  altogether	  and	  set	  out	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  it	  can	  be	  cleared	  if	  it	  is	  
above	  the	  threshold.32	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Commission press release, State aid: Commission exempts more aid measures from prior notification, 21 May 
2014 
32 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and 
energy 2014-2020 OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1–55 
